Abstract This paper analyzes judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently votes on a set of complex propositions subject to an interdependency constraint. It considers the issue of judgement aggregation from the perspective of approximation; that is, it generalizes the classic framework of judgement aggregation by relaxing the two main constraints assumed in the literature, Consistency and Independence. In doing so, it also considers mechanisms that only approximately satisfy these constraints, that is, satisfy them up to a small fraction of the inputs. The main question raised is whether the relaxation of these constraints significantly alters the class of aggregation mechanisms that meet the two (relaxed) constraints. The main result of this paper is that in the case of a subclass of a natural class of aggregation problems termed "truth-functional agendas," the set of aggregation mechanisms that meet the constraints does not extend nontrivially when the constraints are relaxed. This paper also shows connections between this new general framework and the works on approximation of preference aggregation as well as the field of Property Testing and particularly linear testing of Boolean functions.
Introduction
A famous jury paradox shows that aggregating complex decisions can be nontrivial. Assume a jury is faced with a case in which a defendant is accused of murder. The legal doctrine (known to all the jurors) is that the defendant should be convicted if and only if the jury is convinced that a) the defendant killed the victim and b) the defendant is sane. We assume that each of the jurors decides on the two issues independently and based on these decisions decides whether to convict. Then, the jury members cast their votes simultaneously and no strategic behavior is assumed on their behalf. Kornhauser and Sager [33] noticed that it is possible to have an opinion profile in which, in the case of aggregation using issue-wise majority, a discrepancy arises between the majority vote on the conviction question and the conjunction of the majority votes on the two basic questions (whether the defendant killed and whether he is sane). For instance, consider the following scenario:
Killed Sane Guilty 3 jurors: 4 jurors: × × 5 jurors: × × That is, each juror votes on each of the three issues, three of the twelve jurors cast the vote that the defendant killed the victim and is sane and hence should be convicted, four jurors vote that the defendant is sane but did not kill the victim and hence should be acquitted, and five voters vote that the defendant killed the victim but is insane and hence should be acquitted. Then, there is a majority (of seven jurors) that votes that the defendant is sane, a majority (of nine jurors) that votes that the defendant killed the victim, but only a minority (of three jurors) that votes to convict him. This discrepancy is termed The Doctrinal Paradox. In a recent work, List [37] showed that the probability of getting such a discrepancy is nonnegligible under the uniform distribution over all profiles of votes and also under several distributions close to the uniform distribution. This paradox, common to many aggregation problems in a wide range of disciplines, such as economics, computer science, political science, philosophy, and law, has given rise to the field of "Judgement Aggregation." We find this field highly applicable to agent systems, voting protocols in a network, and other frameworks in which one needs to aggregate a lot of opinions in a systematic way without letting the voters deliberate. We are interested in questions of how one can or should aggregate the opinions of several individuals into one representative opinion. We disregard persuasion, influence, imitation, and other interpersonal interactions between the jurors. An aggregation problem is defined by a given set of {0, 1}-vectors of length m (the number of issues) that defines the consistent (legal/rational/admissible) opinions that an individual can hold. This set is called the Agenda and we denote it by X. Given an agenda, Judgement Aggregation seeks to aggregate the opinions of (often many) experts/judges while maintaining two main properties:
• Consistency-Always return an admissible opinion. In the example above, the aggregated opinion should be "to convict" if the aggregated opinion was that the defendant killed and that he is sane.
• Independence-Define the aggregated opinion on each issue independently of the votes on other issues. This criterion can be interpreted as respecting the structure of the agenda and not treating it as a set of opinions (four opinions in the doctrinal paradox example described above).
For most agendas, the set of "acceptable" aggregation mechanisms (i.e., that satisfy the two criteria) is very small and undesired (e.g., dictatorships) and hence the characterization results of these sets are usually considered to be impossibility results. A survey of this field can be found in [38, 40, 41] . Such impossibility results are quite strong; they show the impossibility of finding any reasonable aggregation mechanism that satisfies the two conditions and hence for (almost) every mechanism there is always some judgement profile that leads to a breakdown of the mechanism.
This paper extends the question to Approximate Judgement Aggregation. We relax the above two properties and search for an aggregation mechanism that only approximately respects the structure of the agenda and up to a small fraction of the inputs returns a consistent opinion. More specifically, we are interested in exploring the consequence of relaxing the two properties on the set of "acceptable" aggregation mechanisms.
The δ-consistency property of an aggregation mechanism F quantifies it as being almost consistent. F is δ-consistent if there is a consistent aggregation mechanism G that disagrees with F on at most a fraction δ of the inputs. 1 Similarly, the δ-independence property quantifies it as being almost independent. An aggregation mechanism F is δ-independent if there is an independent aggregation mechanism that disagrees with F on at most a fraction δ of the inputs. In Section 2, we show that both terms can be equivalently defined as the failure probability of tests. Both definitions use the Hamming distance between mechanisms d X (F, G) = Pr F(X) = G(X) , where X is a profile sampled uniformly at random. This distribution is defined by two assumptions: the assumption that the votes of the jurors are independent and the assumption that the different opinions of each juror are equiprobable (Impartial Culture Assumption). These assumptions, while certainly unrealistic, are the natural choice in this kind of work and are discussed further in Section 2.
A recent series of works attempts to circumvent impossibility results in Social Choice Theory using approximations (e.g., [10, 26] ). In some cases approximation enables significantly better results, while in others hardly anything is gained by it.
For example, Caragiannis et al. [10] show that approximating Dodgson's scoring rule (used for preference aggregation) results in several desired properties (monotonicity, homogeneity, low complexity) that Dodgson's rule does not achieve. Hence, they show that approximation (although maybe with a large approximation ratio) circumvent the characters of the strict Dodgson's rule. On the other hand, Friedgut et al. [26] show that relaxing the strategy-proofness property when studying aggregation of preferences to one alternative (the winner) does not extend the set of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy (relaxed) strategy-proofness nontrivially and hence they strengthen the classic impossibility result of Gibbard [27] and of Satterthwaite [55] by proving a quantitative version of the impossibility result. This paper formalizes this question of quantifying the influence of relaxing the constraints and explores whether such a relaxation circumvents the impossibility results (à la Caragiannis et al. [10] ) or whether a more robust impossibility results holds (à la Friedgut et al. [26] ). This paper studies approximate aggregation for truth-functional agendas. This family includes the doctrinal paradox described above as well as many other agendas. In a truth-functional agenda [40] the issues are divided into two types: premises and conclusions. Each conclusion j is characterized by a Boolean function j over the premises and an opinion is consistent if the answers to the conclusion issues are attained by applying the function j on the answers to the premise issues:
We use logic notations (e.g., the conjunction operator ∧, the xor/exclusive-or operator ⊕, and the disjunction operator ∨) to define the conclusion issues; We define formally the notations in Section 2.2. For instance, the 2-premises conjunction agenda used in the example is a truth-functional agenda with two premises and one conclusion and it is denoted by A, B, A ∧ B . For all the agendas we have examined, relaxing the two constraints, consistency and independence, does not extend the set of acceptable aggregation mechanisms in a nontrivial way. We shall concentrate on two basic agenda families: Conjunc- The other direction is trivial; that is, if there exists a consistent and independent aggregation mechanism G that returns the same result as F for at least a fraction (1 − ) of the profiles, then F is δ-independent and δ-consistent for δ linear in . Hence, the function δ, the existence of which is guaranteed by the theorem, must be at least linear in . A polynomial bound as proved above, shows that relaxing the two properties does not extend the set of acceptable aggregation mechanisms in a far from trivial way. Relaxation of strict consistency and independence leads to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the consistent independent aggregation mechanisms. The characterization for the sets of the independent and consistent aggregation mechanisms for these two agendas is known to be very small and undesired.
These results show that for the agendas considered, one can get arbitrarily close to the set of independent consistent aggregation mechanisms by relaxing the consistency and independence constraints. That is, for both agenda types (conjunction and xor) and any number of premises, there is a polynomial dependency (polynomial in ) between the relaxation (δ) and the proximity to the set of independent consistent mechanisms ( ).
One significant difference between the two results is the dependency on the number of voters (n). While the result for xor agendas does not depend on this parameter, the result for conjunction agendas depends (polynomially) on n. This means that for a given agenda and value for δ, the upper bound on the proximity of δ-relaxed aggregation mechanisms to the set of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms grows with n (although the growth is polynomially bounded).
For both agenda families, this dependency is also a function of the number of premises (m), and hence the result weakens as the number of premises grows. This means that the neighborhood of the set of independent and consistent aggregation mechanisms guaranteed by δ-relaxation (for a fixed δ) grows with m; e.g., the dependency in n for the conjunction agendas is polynomial, but nevertheless the minimal value for n for which this result is significant (e.g., results in a small neighborhood of the set of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms) grows with m. For the conjunction agendas, δ degrades exponentially in m and hence this dependency degrades very fast, which makes it an even weaker result compared to the result we show for the xor agendas.
We do not show a lower bound on the dependency (i.e., proving the "glass half empty" part of the negative result). We conjecture that the lower bound should be at least linear in (this is trivial when is very small and the neighborhood includes few profiles), but at this stage we do not have a better nontrivial conjecture. This leaves an open question of characterizing the lower bound and studying whether the above results can be improved significantly (by an order of magnitude). In particular, we would like to study whether the dependency on n for conjunction agendas is inherent for these agendas, and whether a lower than polynomial dependency can be proven.
From the above two basic approximate aggregation results, we derive similar approximate aggregation results for more complex agendas, namely truth-functional agendas in which each conclusion is def ined as a conjunction or a xor of some premises up to input and output negation (notated TFA(∧, ⊕)), e.g.,
. Two interesting subfamilies of this set are the agendas of the form
for any function and the affine agendas. 4 Hence, the above results of approximate aggregation can be seen as a result stating the impossibility of finding a mechanism that is almost consistent and almost independent other than the trivial solutions, namely, the relatively small and undesired set of independent consistent mechanisms and small perturbations of these mechanisms.
An open question is whether it is possible to find such bounds for any agenda or whether there exists an agenda for which the class of aggregation mechanisms satisfying consistency and independence expands nontrivially when the consistency and independence constraints are relaxed.
Previous works
There is a long line of works that attempt to circumvent impossibility results in Judgement Aggregation (i.e., works showing that the set of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms is an undesired small set). Most of these works suggest consistent aggregating mechanisms while still trying to stay "reasonably close" to independence (e.g., [7, 16, 18, 32, 33, 36, 39, 50, 51] ). These classical works are heuristic, sometimes use the semantics of the agenda, and mainly do not state bounds on the compliance to the independence property. List [37] studies the asymptotic probability of an inconsistent result in the 2-premise conjunction agenda A, B, A ∧ B for some voter-independent distributions 5 and common aggregation mechanisms (majority-based and supermajority-based). He mainly studies the conditions for the probability to converge to zero and the conditions for the probability to converge to one.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only work that deals with quantifying, although only asymptotically, the property compliance of an aggregation mechanism for agendas other than the Arrovian agenda (preference aggregation).
Another approach is Approximate Aggregation. This line of research was started by Kalai [29] and was later extended by Mossel [45] and Keller [30] . In these works the authors deal with aggregation of social preferences (without defining the general framework of approximate aggregation) and show that relaxing the transitivity constraint (that is equivalent to consistency for this agenda) does not extend the set of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy (relaxed) transitivity nontrivially. This result is neither derived from the results in this paper nor are they derived from it because the agendas dealt with in this paper and the preference agenda are too different (for instance, the preference agenda cannot be represented as a truthfunctional agenda and in some sense it is even far from being represented as such).
Campbell and Kelly [8] showed results of a similar flavor (but their work does not fit in the framework we define).
They deal with aggregation of preferences and prove the following "trade-off theorem" between the non-dictatorship property and the surjectivity property: For any fraction t, either there is some individual who dictated the aggregated preference on at least a fraction t of alternatives space, or the aggregated pairwise comparison of at least a fraction (1 − t) of the pairs is fixed independently of individual preference.
Proof techniques
The main theorem is proved first for the specific case of independent aggregation mechanisms that are δ-consistent. Furthermore, it is proved for two basic agenda families: conjunction agendas (agendas in which there is exactly one conclusion that is constrained to be the conjunction of the premises-Theorem 5.1) and xor agendas (agendas in which there is exactly one conclusion that is constrained to be the xor of the premises-Theorem 5.3). In a second stage, these two theorems are extended to the general theorem of relaxing both constraints (Theorem 5.4). The method used for this extension does not depend on the agenda and hence this method of proving negative approximate aggregation results can be replicated for other agendas. The general theorem, for any number of conclusions, is proved using induction over the number of conclusions.
We employ two different techniques in the proofs. For the conjunction agendas, the influence measures of voters on the issue-aggregation functions are analyzed, 6 and for the xor agendas, Fourier analysis of the issue-aggregation functions is employed.
Connection to property testing
The question of approximate aggregation can be phrased using terminology of property testing. The field of property testing deals with testing a function for a global property (in the case of approximate aggregation, the property is that of being a consistent independent aggregation mechanism) by querying it at a small number of (random) points. We think this connection between the fields will prove to be fruitful. For example, a corollary of the theorem described above for the agenda A, B, A ⊕ B (in property testing terms) is:
, and Pr h(x) = h (x) are less than C for some constant C independent of n and ∀x, y :
A special case of this result, f = g = h, is the classic result of Blum et al. [3, 5] of linearity testing of Boolean functions. We discuss this connection and its possible implications in Section 4.
Structure
Section 2 describes the formal model of approximate aggregation mechanisms and the main agendas we deal with, truth-functional agendas, and specifically conjunction agendas and xor agendas. Section 3 describes the main theorems. Section 4 states the motivation to deal with approximate aggregation. This section also describes the connection between Property Testing and Approximate Aggregation (which is another motivation for this line of research). The proofs' outline are described in Section 5. The full proofs can be found in the appendices. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The model is similar to the model defined by Dokow and Holzman [20, 21] (which is Rubinstein and Fishburn's model [53] for the Boolean case). There are a few works on aggregating non-Boolean issues, e.g., Rubinstein and Fishburn [53] , Dokow and Holzman [22] , and Claussen and Røisland [13] , but they are beyond the scope of this paper. A different but equivalent definition based on aggregation of proposition sets is also used in the literature. For completeness we include a description of this equivalent definition in Appendix D. We include a description of this equivalent definition in Appendix D. We think the model described below is more suitable for this kind of work, as we claim in Appendix D.
Consider a committee of n individuals that needs to decide on m Boolean issues. An opinion is a vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) ∈ {0, 1} m denoting an answer to each of the issues. An opinion profile is a matrix X ∈ {0, 1} m n denoting the opinions of the committee members, where an entry X j i denotes the vote of the ith voter for the jth issue, the ith row X i states the votes of the ith individual on all issues, and the jth column X j states the votes of each of the individuals on the jth issue. In addition, we are given an agenda X ⊆ {0, 1} m defining consistent opinions. That is, an opinion is a consistent opinion if it is a member of X and a profile is a consistent profile if the opinions of all voters in it are consistent.
The basic notion in this field is an aggregation mechanism that is a function that returns an aggregated opinion (not necessarily consistent) for every profile:
m n → {0, 1} m and we use the notation F j (X) for the jth aggregated opinion according to F given a profile X. For simplicity, the function is defined for all profiles but we are interested in the aggregated opinion only for the cases in which all of the voters (rows) hold a consistent opinion.
An aggregation mechanism satisfies Consistency (and the mechanism is itself consistent) if for every consistent profile X (all voters voted consistent opinions), the aggregated opinion F (X) is also consistent. An aggregation mechanism satisfies Independence (and the mechanism is itself independent) if for every two consistent profiles X and Y and an issue j, if X j = Y j (all individuals voted the same on the jth issue in both profiles) then F j (X) = F j (Y) (the aggregated opinion for the jth issue is the same for both profiles). This means that F satisfies independence if there are m Boolean functions
. 7 An independent aggregation mechanism satisfies Systematicity if all issues are aggregated using the same function, i.e., F (X) = f X 1 , . . . , f (X m ) for some issueaggregation function f . We denote the independent aggregation mechanism that aggregates the jth issue using f j by f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m . Approximate aggregation questions are defined with regard to the following three proximity measures over the space of aggregation mechanisms. They are defined with respect to the uniform distribution over the consistent profiles. This distribution is clearly unrealistic but we think there is some value in using it in this work, as we shall explain shortly. The uniform distribution can be decomposed to two assumptions on the opinion profile distribution. First, there is an assumption that the voters pick their opinions independently and from the same distribution. Second, there is an assumption of a uniform distribution over the (consistent) opinions for each voter. In the social choice literature these assumptions are usually referred to as IC -Impartial Culture Assumption.
First, we define the distance between two aggregation mechanisms for a given agenda X. Definition 2.1 (Distance between aggregation mechanisms) For an agenda X, the distance between two aggregation mechanisms F and G for X is defined as the probability of getting a disagreement between them (we regard a disagreement as different results and do not quantify the difference):
The two main measures of an aggregation mechanism F for a given agenda X are the Inconsistency Index IC X (F) and the Dependency Index DI X (F). These two measures are relaxations of the consistency and independence criteria that are usually assumed. 8 ) For an agenda X and an aggregation mechanism F for that agenda, the inconsistency index is defined as the probability of getting an inconsistent result:
Definition 2.2 (Inconsistency index
We say that 9 ) For an agenda X and an aggregation mechanism F for that agenda, the dependency vector DI j,X (F) is defined as
Definition 2.3 (Dependency index
The definition can be interpreted as a 2-stage test for independence of the jth issue, as discussed in Section 4. The dependency index
We say that
In contexts where the agenda is clear we omit the agenda superscript and denote these indices as IC (F), DI j (F), and DI (F), respectively. These indices are considered to be relaxations of the consistency and independence properties since F satisfies consistency iff IC (F) = 0 and F satisfies independence iff DI (F) = 0, and in that sense the indices quantify the compliance of F to the two desired properties.
These two indices are defined using local tests and we prove that the more natural definition of distance to the class of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency (or independence) is equivalent to the above up to multiplication by a constant. 1 2 δ and there exists an independent aggregation mechanism H that satisf ies d (F, H ) 2mδ.
Proposition 2.4 Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda X and δ > 0 be a constant. Then F satisf ies IC (F) δ if and only if there exists a consistent aggregation mechanism H s.t. d (F, H) δ.

Proposition 2.5 Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda X satisfying DI (F) = δ and let m be the number of issues of X. Then every independent aggregation mechanism H satisf ies d (F, H)
The uniform distribution assumption, while certainly unrealistic, is the natural choice for proving lower bounds on IC (F) of the format "Every 'reasonable' aggregation mechanism of a given class has inconsistency index of at least γ (n)." In particular, the lower bound, up to a factor δ, applies also to any distribution that gives each preference profile at least a fraction δ of the probability given by the uniform distribution. In a subsequent work (Nehama, unpublished) we relax this assumption and prove similar results for more general distributions.
The independence property
The independence criterion is sometimes criticized as being unjustified normatively in most real-life scenarios. E.g., Chapman [11] and Mongin [44] attack this criterion and claim it removes the discipline of reason from social choice since it disregards the intra-issue dependencies that are the essence of the problem. According to this criterion, the aggregation of "complex" issues is done without regard for the reasons of the voters for their opinions and hence lacks the information for good aggregation. The impossibility results of judgement aggregation can also be seen as "empirical" arguments against independence since they show that it contradicts consistency, which seems to be a more desired property. While we accept this argument, we think the work described in this paper quantifies the tradeoff between the two criteria. Moreover, in this section we claim that independence is justified on several different grounds.
Firstly, in a lot of cases it is justified to expect that changing an individual judgement on an issue should not change the collective judgement on another issue, e.g., due to normative reasons or legal reasons. The rationale is usually that when the agenda is described as having a combinatorial structure (or perceived in such way), the aggregation method should respect the structure and not treat the agenda as a set of alternatives.
Secondly, as in the case of multi-issue voting domains [35] , when the number of voters is small compared to the number of possible opinions, the outcome of the natural ways of aggregating might be nonsignificant. For instance, using plurality when the number of voters is too small could well result in a situation where no outcome gets more than one vote, in which case plurality would give an extremely poor result.
In addition, there are works that defend this criterion by using manipulationresistance arguments. Dietrich and List [19] define the notion of manipulability of an aggregation mechanism 10 and prove that any aggregation mechanism that does not satisfy independence is manipulable. In the same paper they further prove that this manipulability property is equivalent to a more game-theoretic property of strategyproofness under some assumptions on players' preferences.
On the ground of simplicity of representation, independence is defended as a criterion that returns aggregation mechanisms that are easy to represent, calculate, or explain (for instance, in order to justify an election result to the public).
Independent aggregation mechanisms can also be justified taking the voter's point of view. There are situations in which the decisions are made over time and place (e.g., different meetings) or even made by different representatives of the same voting entity, and so it is fair to assume that when voting on an issue or when aggregating the votes it is unreasonable to depend on votes on other issues.
Lastly, there are scenarios in which it is necessary to define the aggregation method first and only at a later stage it is revealed which issues are (ex-post) relevant to the decision of the committee. For instance, a social welfare function aggregates rational choice functions (which are equivalent to transitive pairwise alternatives comparison vectors) to an aggregated choice function, which is a function returning for each ex-post relevant alternatives subset, the most preferred alternative. In such scenarios, it reasonable to decide on the aggregated opinion on an issue independently in votes on other issues which might not be ex-post relevant. 10 An aggregation mechanism F is manipulable at the profile X by individual i (the manipulator) on
for some profile X that differs from X in i's vote only. I.e., the manipulator disagrees with the aggregated opinion on issue j and is able to achieve his will on j by voting differently.
Boolean functions
Since this work deals with Boolean functions (as issue-aggregation functions), we define several notations for this framework as well. 11 For ease of presentation, in the sequel we shall identify True with 1 and False with 0 and use logical operators on bits and bit vectors (using entry-wise semantics). The three main bit operators used are conjunction, xor (exclusive or), and negation. The conjunction of n bits, denoted
x i , is True if and only if all the n bits are True. The xor of n bits, denoted
is True if and only if an odd number of the n bits are True. The negation of a bit, denoted x, is True if and only the bit is False. These operators can be composed to get more complex operators. E.g., x 1 ∧ x 2 is True if and only if x 1 is True and x 2 is False. Notice that any operator of two bits can be written as a conjunction or a xor up to the negation of the input or the output. 12 Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function. f is the oligarchy of a coalition S if it is of the form f (x) = ∧ i∈S x i . This means that f returns 1 if all the members of S voted 1. We denote by Olig Olig Olig the class of all 2 n oligarchies. Two special cases of oligarchies are the constant 1 function which is the oligarchy of the empty coalition and the dictatorships which are oligarchies of a single voter
f is a linear function if it is of the form f (x) = ⊕ i∈S x i for some coalition S. 13 This means that f returns 1 if an odd number of the members of S voted 1. We denote by Lin Lin Lin the class of all 2 n linear functions. Two special cases of linear functions are the constant 1 function which is the xor function over the empty coalition and the dictatorships which are xor of a single voter.
In addition, we define a distance function over the Boolean functions. The distance between two functions f, g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is defined as the probability of getting different results (normalized Hamming distance),
. From this measure we derive a distance from a function to a set of functions
Finally, for a binary vector x ∈ {0, 1} n and a coalition J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . n}, x J denotes the entries of x that correspond to J.
Agenda examples
A lot of natural problems can be formulated in the framework of aggregation mechanisms. It is natural to divide the agendas into two major classes: TruthFunctional Agendas and Non-Truth-Functional Agendas. 11 For a more extensive introduction to Boolean functions, the reader is referred to , e.g., [14] . 12 The sixteen operators of two bits are: constant 0, constant 1, 2 , and x 1 ⊕ x 2 . 13 An equivalent definition is: f is linear if ∀x, y : f (x) + f (y) = f (x + y) when the addition is in Z 2 and Z n 2 , respectively.
Truth-functional agendas
A (k-premise) truth-functional agenda is defined by a conclusions function
conclusions. An opinion is consistent if the answers to the conclusion issues are attained by applying on the answers to the premise issues:
There are cases in which there is more than one way to classify the issues to premises and conclusions. For instance, the 2-premise xor agenda X = {001, 010, 100, 111} can be defined both as A, B, A ⊕ B and as A, A ⊕ C, C . Since we analyze agendas as opinion sets (and not as a proposition set), this point is irrelevant to the results presented here.
These agendas, due to their structure, seem to be a good starting point for work on approximate aggregation, and in this paper we deal with two families of truthfunctional agendas -conjunction agendas and xor agendas. Later in the paper, we derive results for a more general family of truth-functional agendas, namely, agendas with several conclusions s.t. each conclusion is either a conjunction or a xor of some of the premises up to the negation of inputs or output.
Conjunction agendas In the m-premise conjunction agenda
there are m + 1 issues to decide on and according to the consistency criterion the last issue is a conjunction of the other issues. For instance, the Doctrinal Paradox agenda is the 2-premise conjunction agenda.
Xor agendas Similarly, in the m-premise xor agenda
A j there are m + 1 issues to decide on and according to the consistency criterion the last issue is True if the number of true-valued opinions for the first m is odd. An equivalent way to define this agenda is by constraining the number of True answers to be even.
Af f ine agendas A subfamily of the family of truth-functional agendas is affine agendas. The characterization of affine agendas comes from Linear Algebra. An agenda is affine if the set of admissible opinions forms an affine space of the linear vector space {0, 1} m . That is, a subset obtained from a linear subspace by adding a fixed vector to each of its elements. Dokow and Holzman showed several equivalent definitions of affine agendas [21, Proposition 2.1]. We add to this characterization and prove that any affine agenda is a truth-functional agenda in which all the conclusions are defined using the xor function (Lemma C.4) and from that lemma we derive an aggregation approximation results for the affine agendas.
Given a family of Boolean functions B, we define the family of truth-functional agendas TFA(B) as all the truth-functional agendas in which each conclusion is defined by one of the functions in B over the premises or a subset of the premises, up to the negation of inputs or output. 
) (and in short TFA(∧, ⊕)) is the set of all truth-functional agendas s.t. each conclusion issue is either a conjunction of several premises or a xor of several premises up to the negation of inputs or of the output . For example, A, B, A ∧ B , A, B, A → B ≡ A, B, A ∧ B , and  A, B, C, A ∧ B, B ⊕ C, A ∨ C . 
Non-truth-functional agendas
Many agendas cannot be represented as truth-functional agendas. These include equivalence agendas [25] , membership agendas [42, 54] , and preference agendas [1] , which we describe below.
Preference aggregation Aggregation of preferences is probably the oldest aggregation framework studied. In this framework there are s candidates and each individual holds a full strict order over them. The aggregation mechanisms studied are Social Welfare Functions (SWF) which are functions that aggregate n orders to an aggregated order. Nehring [47] and later Dietrich and List [17] showed that this problem can be framed naturally in terms of judgement aggregation by defining s 2 issues in the following way: the issue i, j (for i < j) represents whether an individual prefers the alternative c i to the alternative c j , and the agenda (the consistent opinions) is defined by transitivity of the pairwise comparisons (the issues). In this framework, a "consistent mechanism" means that the SWF should return an order (and not a comparison cycle, e.g., a is preferred to b , b is preferred to c, and c is preferred to a). Independence in this case is called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and it means that the aggregated pairwise comparison (an issue) should be determined by votes on this pairwise comparison only.
Main results
The main result of this paper is: β .
14
A direct corollary (proved in Appendix A) is the following impossibility result.
14 Notice that the theorem holds vacuously when δ IC or δ DI are negative. 2m−1 , and a truth-functional agenda X over m issues in TFA(∧, ⊕), there exits no aggregation mechanism F for X over n voters that satisf ies the following three conditions:
• F is -far from any independent and consistent aggregation mechanism for X.
In the case of xor agenda (and for the family TFA(⊕)) a better result holds (specially, there is no dependency on the number of voters): Since an affine agenda can be represented as a truth-functional agenda that uses xor conclusions only (Lemma C.4), it belongs to TFA(⊕) and the following corollary is immediate: 
Motivation
We find the motivation for dealing with the field of approximate judgement aggregation in three different disciplines.
• The characterizations of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms are often regarded as "impossibility results" in the sense that they permit a very restrictive set of aggregation mechanisms (e.g., Arrow's theorem [1] shows that there is no "reasonable" way to aggregate preferences). We shed light on these impossibility results by extending them to approximate aggregation characterizations by relaxing the constraints. In doing so we join a long line of works studying the influence of relaxing or perturbing the conditions for Arrow's theorem for preference aggregation (e.g., [8, 9, 29, 30] ).
• Questions of Judgement Aggregation have arise often in Philosophy, Law, and Political Science. Many studies in these fields have suggested consistent aggregating mechanisms while still trying to stay "reasonably close" to independence. The main general (not agenda-tailored) suggestions are premise-based mechanisms and conclusion-based aggregation mechanisms for truth-functional agendas (see, among others, [7, 16, 32, 33, 39, 50] ), as well as a generalization of them to nontruth-functional agendas called sequential priority aggregation [18, 36] . Another procedure in the literature is the distance-based aggregation [34] which is well known for preference aggregation (e.g., Kemeny voting rule [31] , Dodgson voting rule [4] , and a more systematic analysis by Elkind et al. [23] ). The strand of literature on approximate aggregation contributes to this discussion by pointing out where one should search for solutions while not dispensing with consistency and independence constraints entirely.
• Connection to the Property Testing field as described below.
In the words of Ron [52] , Property Testing deals with the following:
Given the ability to perform (local) queries concerning a particular object (e.g., a function or a graph), the task is to determine whether the object has a predetermined (global) property (e.g., linearity or bipartiteness), or is far from having the property. The task should be performed by inspecting only a small (possibly randomly selected) part of the whole object, where a small probability of failure is allowed. Property testing trades accuracy (the distance parameter) for efficiency (number of queries).
An approximate aggregation problem can be defined in the framework of property testing. We find a connection between approximate aggregation and a special case of property testing termed "one-sided nonadaptive program testing." For a general survey of the field, see [24, 28, 52] . In the case of approximate aggregation, the global property tested is "consistency and independence" of an aggregation mechanism. The classic literature of Judgement Aggregation characterizes the class of aggregation mechanisms satisfying this property (i.e., independent consistent aggregation mechanisms). It is clear that each of the components of this property, consistency and independence, is trivially testable. The consistency test consists of picking a (consistent) profile uniformly at random and checking whether the aggregated opinion is consistent. The test for independence of issue j consists of picking a (consistent) profile uniformly at random, randomly altering the opinion for each voter without changing the jth bit, and then checking whether the aggregated opinion on the jth issue is changed due to the alteration. For each of the two tests the probability of accepting a mechanism that does not satisfy the property is linear in the distance to the satisfying set and equals IC (F) and DI j (F), respectively. The question of approximate aggregation can be stated in property-testing terms as follows:
What is the best test for being "consistent and independent" one can assemble from running the (m + 1) tests as black boxes (and therefore obtaining information only on IC (F) and DI j (F))?
Similar question was studied by Chen et al. [12] , who explored the conditions needed in order to deduce from the testability of two properties the testability of the intersection of those two properties. In this paper, we do the same for a specific natural domain-consistency and independence of aggregation mechanisms-imposing the additional constraint that the test of the intersection property should be defined as a sequence of tests for the basic properties (in a nonadaptive way). The main result of this paper is that for a class of mechanisms corresponding to a natural class of agendas the test for "consistency" and the test for "independence" can be assembled to form a test for the "consistency and independence." Similar questions dealing with subfamilies of aggregation mechanisms may also be asked. For example, as stated in the introduction, the classic result of Blum, Luby, and Rubinfeld for linearity testing of Boolean functions [3, 5] is a direct corollary of the result proved here for the 2-premise xor agenda when considering systematic aggregation mechanisms. Still, the focus of the two fields differs. While property testing deals with finding the most efficient (query-wise) algorithm for testing a property, approximate aggregation deals with analyzing the performance of a specific family of tests.
Proof sketch of the main theorem
In this section we sketch the techniques behind the proofs. The full proofs can be found in the appendices. The main theorem (Theorem 3.1) for TFA(∧, ⊕) is proved by proving each of the following three theorems in turn: an approximation result for independent aggregation mechanisms for conjunction agendas (Theorem 5.1), an approximation result for independent aggregation mechanisms for xor agendas (Theorem 5.3), and an agenda-independent method for converting results from the independent case to the general case where both constraints are relaxed (Theorem 5.4). The main resultTheorem 3.1-is proved from the above theorems by using induction on the number of conclusions and noticing that the negation of the inputs and of the output is tantamount tvo renaming opinions which does not affect the approximation results. The special case of TFA(⊕)-Theorem 3.3-is attained by combining Theorems 5.3 and 5.4.
Conjunction agenda
For the conjunction agenda we prove:
Theorem 5.1 Given an independent aggregation mechanism F over n voters for the
agenda X = A 1 , . . . , A m , m ∧ j=1 A j
for m 2 and a constant > 0, if IC (F) then there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisf ies consistency and independence such that d (F, G)
The characterizations of the set of consistent independent aggregation mechanisms for the conjunction agenda is known. It is a direct corollary of several works in the more general framework of aggregation, e.g., Nehring and Puppe [48] and Dokow and Holzman [20] . 
A corollary of the above is a characterization of the approximate aggregation mechanisms for this agenda. In fact, the proof of Theorem 5.1 proves a tighter characterization that distinguishes between the two cases: being close to an aggregation mechanism with a constant issue-aggregation function, and being close to an oligarchy aggregation mechanism.
Proof sketch Let F = f 1 , . . . , f m , h be an aggregation mechanism satisfying IC (F) . In the case where for some j, f j is close to the constant zero function, F must be close to the following independent consistent aggregation mechanism -G = g 1 , . . . , g m , h "g j and h are the constant zero function and all other issueaggregation functions are the same as in F (g j = f j )." Otherwise, all f j are far from the constant zero function (i.e., all these functions are of distance at least for some ). In order to analyze this case, the following measures for the influence of an individual or a coalition of individuals on a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} are defined. Both definitions use the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n (which is consistent with the assumption on the profile distribution).
• The Influence of a voter i on f is defined as the probability that the voter is able to change the result by changing his vote:
x ⊕ e i = adding the ith elementary vector to x, i.e., flipping the ith bit 0 ↔ 1).
• The (zero-)Ignorability of a voter i on f is defined as the probability that f returns 1 while i votes 0:
(we did not find a similar index defined in the voting literature or in the cooperative games literature).
• A generalization of the above definition is the (zero-)Ignorability of a coalition S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. It is defined as the probability that f returns 1 while one of the members of S votes 0: (So
The main insight in the proof (Lemma B4) is that for any coalition S and any two issue-aggregation functions f j and f k , the product of P S f k and min
is bounded by a function of the inconsistency index of F:
for a constant C that depends solely on simple characteristics of the other issue-aggregation functions. Using this insight, we show that any of the f j functions is 4n 1−m -close to a function g j that is determined by log 2 2 / voters, for = min j d f j , 0 . So if is big enough (with respect to ), 16 In voting games (or simple cooperative games), this index is called the "Banzhaf-Penrose power index" of player i in the game f [2] . In this framework, a complete list of all the winning coalitions is given and the goal is to define the power of each individual. It is defined as the probability of being pivotal for a coalition (changing the coalition's status from losing to winning by joining or leaving it) given some distribution over the 2 n coalitions. In addition, there are also several axiomatizations of this value. The interested reader can find an introduction to this field in [43, 56] .
there must exist an issue-aggregation function h s.t. G = g 1 , . . . , g m , h is close to F and consistent. The latter holds since IC (G) is close to IC (F) (and hence small) but is determined by a small number of votes (and hence cannot be strictly non-zero too small a number).
Xor agenda
For the xor agenda we prove: 
Given an independent aggregation mechanism small, E is close to one and there exists a linear function such that all the functions f j and h are close to it (or to its negation). Noticing that for any linear function χ , χ, χ, · · · , χ (and the result of negation of any even number of functions) is a consistent independent aggregation mechanism for this agenda gives the requested approximation result.
Extension to δ-independence results
In order to extend the above results to the δ-independent case (DI (F) = 0), the following theorem is applied. This theorem does not depend on the agenda and hence can be applied to agendas beyond the ones dealt with in this paper (both truthfunctional agendas and non-truth-functional agendas).
Theorem 5.4 Let n 2 be a constant, X an agenda, and δ ( ) a function s.t. for any > 0 and an independent aggregation mechanism F for X over n voters satisfying IC (F) δ ( ), there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisf ies consistency and independence such that d (F, G)
.
Then, there exist two functions δ IC ( ) and δ DI ( ) s.t. for any > 0 and an aggregation mechanism F for X over n voters satisfying IC (F) δ IC ( ) and DI (F) δ DI ( ), there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisf ies consistency and independence such that d (F, G) .
Moreover, for any β ∈ [0, 1], the theorem holds for δ IC = δ ((1 − β ) ) − β and
β .
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The theorem is proved using Proposition 2.5 that shows that the difference between the dependency index DI and the proximity (distance-wise) to the set of independent aggregation mechanisms is small. Therefore, if F is δ-independent, there is a independent aggregation mechanism H close to F. Since the mechanism H is close to F, it is possible to deduce bounds on the proximity of F to the consistent and independent aggregation mechanisms from bounds on the proximity of H to this set. Similarly, it is possible to deduce that if F is δ-consistent then H is δ -consistent for δ close to δ. The theorem is proved by combining the above claims.
Summary and future work
In this paper we defined the question of approximate aggregation, which is a generalization of the study of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy consistency and independence. In particular, we defined measures for the relaxation of the consistency constraint (inconsistency index IC) and for the relaxation of the independence constraint (dependency index DI). To our knowledge, this is the first time this question of approximate aggregation is stated in its general form. This paper shows that relaxing these constraints does not extend the set of aggregation mechanisms that satisfy the two properties in a nontrivial way for any truth-functional in agenda TFA(∧, ⊕), that is, agendas in which every conclusion is either a conjunction or a xor up to the negation of inputs or output. We notice that this family includes all affine agendas and all agendas in which all conclusion issues are functions of two premises. In particular, we calculated the dependency between the extension of this class ( ) and the inconsistency index (δ( )) (although probably not strictly) for two families of truth-functional agendas with one conclusion. The relation we proved includes dependency on the number of voters (n). In studies of preference agendas [29, 30, 45] , as well as in the results shown in this paper for xor agendas, the relation did not include such a dependency. An interesting question is whether the dependency is inherent in conjunction agendas or whether it is possible to prove a relation that does not include it.
A major assumption in this paper is the uniform distribution over the opinion profiles. This distribution is equivalent to assuming independent identical distribution of the different voter's opinions, and uniform distribution over the premises for each voter.
We conjecture that this work can be extended to other distributions over the opinion profiles that seem more realistic, and in subsequent work (Nehama, unpublished) we pursue this direction.
One direction for future research would be to extend the results of this paper to more complex truth-functional agendas and to non-truth-functional agendas and get a result that unifies this work and the works of Kalai [29] , Mossel [45] , and Keller [30] 
on preference agendas.
A major open question is whether one can find an agenda for which relaxing the constraints of independence and consistency extends the set of "acceptable" aggregation mechanisms in a nontrivial way. We conjecture that if such a phenomenon exists, the combinatorial structure of the agenda will not be as simple as truth-functional. For an aggregation mechanisms, the following propositions bridge the consistency index and the dependency indices on one hand and the distance to the set of consistent aggregation mechanisms and the set of independent aggregation mechanisms, respectively, on the other.
Appendix
Proposition (Proposition 2.4) Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda X and δ > 0 be a constant. Then F satisf ies IC (F) δ if and only if there exists a consistent aggregation mechanism H s.t. d (F, H) δ.
Proof
• Assume that IC (F) δ and define the aggregation mechanism H in the following way:
is a consistent outcome c otherwise for some arbitrary consistent opinion c. Then,
• Let H be a consistent aggregation mechanism s.t. Proof Without loss of generality assume that j = 1.
• Assume, towards a contradiction, that H is an aggregatio mechanism such that
and DI 1 (H) = 0. Then,
Since DI 1 (H) = 0, for any two profiles satisfying
and we get a contradiction.
• We define H by defining the functions h 1 , . . . , h m : X n → {0, 1} as follows:
and H by H (X) = h 1 (X) , . . . , h m (X) . For any profile X, h 1 (X) is determined by the first column X 1 and hence for any two profiles X and Y s.t.
Proposition (Proposition 2.5) Let F be an aggregation mechanism for an agenda X satisfying DI (F) = δ and let m be the number of issues of X. Then every independent aggregation mechanism H satisf ies d (F, H) 1 2 δ and there exists an independent aggregation mechanism H that satisf ies d (F, H ) 2mδ.
• DI (F) = δ so there is an issue j s.t. DI j (F) = δ. Hence, by Proposition A.1, every independent aggregation mechanism H (that clearly satisfies
• Define H by defining the issue-aggregation functions
0 otherwise and an (independent) aggregation mechanism
For a pair of independent aggregation mechanisms, the following propositions bridge the pairwise distances between the respective issue-aggregation functions (which we found easier to analyze in most cases) on the one hand and on the other hand, both the distance between the mechanisms, and the difference between their inconsistency indices.
Proposition A.2 Given an agenda X of m issues and two independent aggregation mechanisms over n voters F
. . , g m : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}), the distance between the two mechanisms,
Proposition A.3 Given an agenda X of m issues and two independent aggregation mechanisms over n voters dif fering only in the f irst issue-aggregation function F
As a corollary of the above, the following proposition is derived:
Proposition A. 4 Given an agenda X of m issues and two independent aggregation mechanisms over n voters
. . , g m : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}), the dif ference between the respective incon-
Corollary 3.2 (of Theorem 3.1)
Corollary There exists a constant C 0.25 such that for any m, n 2 and , δ ∈ [0, 1] that satisfy δ < C · 1 mn 8m 2m−1 , and a truth-functional agenda X over m issues in TFA(∧, ⊕), there exits no aggregation mechanism F for X over n voters that satisf ies the following three conditions:
2m−1 for C 0.5 (we do not try to optimize the value for C), and applying Theorem 3.1 yields 
C.
Hence,
Id Agenda
For completeness we provide an approximate aggregation theorem for the id agenda A, A (one premise and one conclusion defined by the id function).
Observation A.5 Given a constant > 0 and an independent aggregation mechanism F = f, g for the id agenda s.t. IC (F) , there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisfies consistency and independence such that d (F, G) .
Proof This theorem holds since
Hence, the aggregation mechanism G = f, f satisfies independence, consistency, and d (F, G) = I F (F) .
B Lemmas and Proofs: Conjunction Agenda
Main theorem for conjunction agendas (Theorem 5.1)
Theorem Given an independent aggregation mechanism F over n voters for the 
, and without loss of generality assume that j = 1, then F is ( + )-close to 0, f 2 , . . . , f m , 0 , which is an independent consistent mechanism. The former holds since
In that case, we use the following lemma (proved in the next subsection). This lemma basically tells that each of the functions f j is close to a function that depends on a small number of voters. This lemma is the main insight needed for the proof. It shows that given an independent aggregation mechanism, we can conclude from its inconsistency index, that an issue-aggregation function (and hence every of its issue-aggregation functions) is almost determined by a small number of voters. We first prove three more technical lemmas (B.1, B.4, and B.5), and using them we prove Lemma B.1.
Lemma B.3
This lemma bounds the distance between a function and its junta function, with respect to a given coalition, by the influence of non-junta members. 
I i ( f ).
Proof Define the functions f
Lemma B.4
This lemma bounds a function of the influence and ignorability of the issueaggregation functions using the inconsistency index. are sampled uniformly and independently from {0, 1} n (like the corresponding columns of a random profile), we get
Lemma B.4 Given issue-aggregation
Denote by E the event ∀ j 3 : f j (x j ) = 1 and by Pr E [A] the probability Pr A | E . Then,
Dividing the event x 2 | S =1 by the first zero entry i yields +e i for adding to x 1 the ith elementary vector which is equivalent to flipping the ith bit 0↔1).
1 and x 2 are independent random variables and therefore
Therefore, we get that
Lemma B.5
This lemma bounds the size of a coalition by its ignorability.
Lemma B.5 Given a Boolean function f
Plugging S ← J in Lemma B.4 yields
Combining the two yields |J| log 2 − 2 2−m n δ
This lemma shows that if an independent aggregation mechanism is defined using a small number of voters and it is not consistent, then the inconsistency index of the function cannot be too small.
Without loss of generality, assume towards a contradiction that f 1 (1) = 0. Then for every x ∈ {0, 1} n we consider the profile defined as X 1 =1 and X j = x for j = 2, . . . , m and get
In other words, h ≡ 0 so we get a contradiction.
• All the issue-aggregation functions satisfy f j = h. We prove that f 1 = h. The proof is similar for all j.
n . Then
Therefore,
Then f 1 depends only on the voters {x i } i∈J . Based on Lemma B.4, for i ∈ J, P i f
, that is, the oligarchy of J.
C Lemmas and Proofs: XOR Agenda
Main Theorem for Xor Agendas (Theorem 5.3)
Theorem Given an independent aggregation mechanism F over n voters for the
, there exists an aggregation mechanism G that satisf ies consistency and independence such that
We prove the following version of the theorem: We rename the values from {0, 1} to {1, −1} in order to facilitate the analysis (use sign multiplication instead of bit xor) and in particular to use the Fourier transformation for the issue-aggregation functions f j . In this proof we use the following properties:
We briefly prove these properties in Appendix E. On the other hand,
First we claim that there exists a coalition A and a sign a
x i is the character indexed by A): Proof We represent the functions using their Fourier coefficients to get
By linearity of expectation we get that
, and hence
Since x j are independent, we can rewrite the expression as 
Proof We prove the inequality by induction over k. For k = 2 the inequality is equivalent to the Cauchy-Swartz inequality
If k > 2 then by using Hölder's inequality 20 we get, Proof Let X be an affine agenda. That is, X affine subspace of {0, 1} m and therefore there exists a k × m matrix A over {0, 1} for some k and a column vector b ∈ {0, 1} k so that X = x ∈ {0, 1} m Ax = b (using the known definition of affine subspaces from elementary linear algebra). There exists an invertible matrix (representing the Gaussian elimination process over A) P s.t.
• PA is in canonical form. That is, for any row t ∈ [k] there is a unique index a t ∈ [m] s.t. (PA) t, j = 1 if j = a t and 0 otherwise.
Hence X is a truth-functional agenda for the premises [m] \ {a t } t∈ [k] and conclusions defined by the rows of PA.
D The Logic-Based Model
In the literature (e.g., [38, 40, 41] ) one finds an equivalent definition of the Judgement Aggregation framework, which is different from the one used in this paper and is logic-based. In this appendix we describe this logic-based notation and the equivalence between the two frameworks. The agenda is modeled as a set of propositions on which judgements are to be made. It is defined as a set X of sentences from a suitable logic, where X is nonempty, closed under negation (i.e., if p ∈ X, then p ∈ X, where p stands for "not p"), and we assume that double negations cancel each other out. The set X can contain not just atomic propositions but also compound propositions such as p ∧ q and p ⊕ q.
Voter i's judgement set is a set of propositions J i ⊆ X that he or she accepts (e.g., endorses or believes to be true). A judgement set is called consistent if it is a consistent set in the logical sense. It is complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair p, p ∈ X.
A profile is an n-tuple of judgement sets across individuals. An aggregation mechanism is a function F that assigns to each profile of individual judgement sets (J 1 , . . . , J n ) in some domain a collective judgement set J = F (J 1 , . . . , J n ), interpreted as the set of propositions accepted by the group as a whole. Usually, the domain of F is required to be the set of all profiles of consistent and complete judgement sets on X (universal domain), and the collective judgement set is required to be complete.
Clearly, a complete judgement set can be modeled by a Boolean vector of length 1 2 |X| that tells for each proposition-negation pair p, p ∈ X which member of the pair the holder of the judgement set accepts. The consistent complete judgement sets define a subset of these Boolean vectors which is the agenda in the model used in this paper. 21 Hence, in both frameworks, an aggregation mechanism is a function that, given a complete consistent judgement set for each voter (his opinion), returns a complete judgement set (that may not be consistent) as the opinion of the society.
We think that the logic-based notation is suitable when considering positive recommendations for aggregation mechanisms since such recommendations, in most cases, depend on the semantics that is modeled in the logic definition of the issues (e.g., one can claim that the agendas A, B, A ⊕ B and A, A ⊕ C, C are not equivalent although they define the same set). On the other hand, this work shows negative results that are even stronger in the more abstract framework that ignores the semantics. Hence, we prefer working with the more "mathematical" framework to study impossibility results while keeping in mind the implications for possible semantically aware mechanisms.
E Fourier Representation of Boolean Functions
Fourier transforms are widely used in mathematics, computer science, and engineering. In this appendix we present the basic properties needed for the proofs in Appendix C. We focus on the narrow case of Boolean functions and do not elaborate on the (beautiful) theory behind it. For an introduction to the subject the interested reader is encouraged to read [15, 49] .
The main idea is to represent a function f : {−1, 1} n → {−1, 1} as a linear combination of the functions χ S : {−1, 1} n → (for S ⊆ [n]) defined by χ S (x) = i∈S x i .
The coefficients in this representation (called the Fourier coefficients) are denoted as f (S). That is, for every x ∈ {−1, 1} n , f (x) =
S⊆[n] f (S) χ S (x).
The properties used in the proofs are stated and proved below. We assume the uniform distribution over {−1, 1} n is given. That is, each entry is sampled uniformly and independently. We use f and g for Boolean functions, x and y for vectors in {−1, 1} n , and S and T for subsets of [n]. 
Proposition E.2 For the symmetric distance def ined as R = (S ∪ T) \ (S ∩ T), χ S (x) χ T (x) = χ R (x).
Proof 
Proposition E.5 f is represented uniquely as a linear combination of χ S : f (x) =
S⊆[n] f (S) χ S (x).
Proof Since E χ S (x) χ T (x) = 1 S = T 0 otherwise , χ S is a set of 2 n linearly independent vectors in the vector space of real functions over {−1, 1} n which is isomorphic to 2 n . This holds since a linear representation of zero using these functions 0 = S a S χ S must satisfy 0 = E S a S χ S (x) · χ S (x) = a S for any S). That is, it is a set of 2 n linearly independent functions in a vector space of dimension 2 n . Therefore, it forms a basis, and any function f is represented uniquely as a linear combination of the basis functions.
